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RESPONSE
EURO-YEARNINGS? MOVING TOWARD A “SUBSTANTIVE”
REGISTRATION-BASED TRADEMARK REGIME†
Jane C. Ginsburg

I

n Alan Jay Lerner’s lyric, Professor Henry Higgins laments: “Why
can’t a woman be more like a man?”1 Professor Rebecca Tushnet’s
provocative article2 in effect urges that a U.S. trademark should be
more like a European Union trademark, at least with respect to the relationship of registration to substantive protection.3 The article convincingly exposes the current incoherence in U.S. trademark law — a
hybrid between “procedural” and “substantive” registration regimes, in
which the traditional emphasis on use-based trademark rights undermines the business-planning benefits that flow from registration.
Before elaborating on the similarities between Tushnet’s suggested
reforms of U.S. trademark law and current EU trademark law, this
Response will articulate the premises underlying use-based and registration-based systems, premises implicit in Tushnet’s arguments, but
which may not be apparent to readers unfamiliar with trademark law.
This Response will then address ways in which the EU trademark registration system offers a model to implement some of Tushnet’s
prescriptions.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
† Responding to Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867 (2017).
 Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia Law School.
Thanks to Lionel Bently for comments on EU trademark law, and to Nathalie Russell, Columbia
Law School class of 2018, for research assistance.
1 ALAN JAY LERNER & FREDERICK LOEWE, A HYMN TO HIM, in MY FAIR LADY (1956).
2 Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867 (2017).
3 Other aspects of the European Union trademark regime may be less compelling — for example the regime’s broader protection against taking unfair advantage of the repute of the trademark. See Council Regulation 207/2009, on the Community Trade Mark, art. 9(2)(c), 2009 O.J. (L
78) 1, 5 (EC) (as amended by Regulation 2015/2424, 2015 O.J. (L 341) 21 (EU)) [hereinafter
EUTMR]; see also infra note 56.
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I. THE UNDERLYING PREMISES OF USE-BASED
AND REGISTRATION-BASED SYSTEMS
Use-based and registration-based systems rely on distinct, and opposing, underlying conceptions of trademark rights. At one extreme,
exemplified by use-based systems, trademark law derives from the traditional common law action of passing off; enforcement of rights in the
mark protects the public against a competitor’s attempts to mislead
the public regarding the source or qualities of goods. The trademark
owner’s claims are proxies for the public interest in honest marketing.
But a trademark fills its role of advancing the public’s interest in
avoiding confusion or deceit only if the public perceives that the
trademark symbolizes a particular producer’s goods. Without the consumer-perception link, the symbol does not “identify and distinguish”4
one producer’s goods, and it therefore is not a trademark. The link
arises from the use of the mark in trade. As the U.S. Supreme Court
emphasized in 1916 in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf5:
[A] man’s right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the
good-will that flows from it, free from unwarranted interference by others,
is a property right, for the protection of which a trade-mark is an instrumentality. . . . [T]he right grows out of use, not mere adoption. . . . [T]he
trade-mark is treated as merely a protection for the good-will, and not the
subject of property except in connection with an existing business.6

At the other extreme, exemplified by registration-based systems,
trademarks are property rights arising out of the government’s acceptance of the mark for registration.7 Use is not a prerequisite to registering a distinctive sign, though subsequent failure to exploit the
mark in trade provides a basis for cancelling the registration.8 As in
use-based systems, the trademark is a distinctive sign that identifies
the goods and their producer;9 trademarks therefore protect both the
producer’s goodwill and the public interest, but it is the registration
that creates the right. Registration attests to the sign’s potential to
link public perception and the registrant,10 but acquisition of rights in
a distinctive sign is not contingent on demonstrating that the mark has
in fact acquired secondary meaning. Thus, an inherently distinctive
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4
5
6

See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining “trademark”).
240 U.S. 403 (1916).
Id. at 413–14; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“At common law the exclusive right to it grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”).
7 See EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 6.
8 See id. arts. 15(1), 51(1)(a) (requiring genuine use within five years of registration but in fact
allowing a mark to be maintained without use unless someone applies to have it revoked).
9 See id. art. 4.
10 See id. art. 7 (declaring a sign’s inability to serve as a trademark if it is “devoid of any distinctive character,” id. art. 7(1)(b), or is a generic term).
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mark need not have entered the marketplace (much less proved itself
there) before legal rights attach. Equally importantly, registration defines the existence and largely delineates the extent of the rights: a sign
denied registration — for example for lack of distinctiveness — is not
an object of protection. Moreover, the “rule of speciality”11 limits the
scope of the rights to the goods or services named in the registration.12
Thus, a use of a mark on goods other than those named in the registration provides no basis to claim trademark infringement by a party who
has adopted the same or similar mark for the unnamed goods;13 in a
use-based system, courts would inquire if the actual use of the mark
(registered or not) has led to its public perception as a trademark for
those goods, so that use by other parties would be likely to confuse the
public concerning the source of marked goods.14 In theory, use-based
systems’ flexibility focuses primarily on the consumer while registration-based systems’ greater formalism favors enterprises because it ensures predictability in the acquisition and scope of rights.
As Tushnet explains, the United States has tried to have it both
ways, grounding rights in use — hence preserving the defining role of
the marketplace — but then undercutting the significance of use by
enhancing a trademark’s scope through registration.15 The Lanham
(Trademark) Act16 provides incentives to register: perhaps most importantly by giving priority dating from filing rather than from first
use in commerce, and also by making trademark rights enforceable na–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
11 See
JOAN ANFOSSI-DIVOL, L’USAGE ET L’ENREGISTREMENT, ÉLÉMENTS
ESSENTIELS DE L’HARMONISATION DU DROIT DES MARQUES: UNE APPROCHE
COMPARATIVE DES DROITS FRANCO-COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DES ETATS-UNIS D’AMÉRIQUE
138 (2003) (“[B]y application of [European] community law, registration is the sole source of
rights, the rule of speciality circumscribes [rights] to the products or services for which the mark
was registered.” (translated from French)). See generally id. at 138–63 (comparing the scope of
the property right in registration-based and use-based systems).
12 Unless the mark is well known and qualifies for protection against dilution under EUTMR
art. 9(2)(c). Moreover, the greater the range of goods or services named in the registration, the less
restraining is the rule of speciality; on the other hand, the registration is subject to cancellation as
to goods or services named in the registration but for which the registrant is not in fact using the
mark after five years.
13 Except for famous marks receiving dilution protection under EUTMR art. 9(2)(c).
14 Similarly, Lanham Act section 2(d) directs that registration may be refused if the mark
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
Dilution of a famous mark is a ground for opposition to registration. See Lanham Act § 13(a), 15
U.S.C. § 1063(a).
15 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 870–71 (“American scholars . . . have often treated registration like
a borrowed civil law coat thrown awkwardly over the shoulders of a common law regime. . . . It’s
time to recognize that it’s our coat and to start making alterations so it fits better.”).
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1127, 1141, 1141a–1141n (2012).
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tionwide17 (while common law rights would exist in only localities in
which the mark is in fact used). Registration thus not only assists title
holders, but also, by creating a publicly searchable record, aids other
businesses’ planning by putting them on notice that the registrant
claims the same or similar mark for the same or similar goods.18 As
Tushnet also demonstrates, however, refusal to register does not necessarily prevent the unsuccessful applicant from using the mark and
building up goodwill protectable by unfair competition claims, both at
state law and under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.19 The disparity
between grounds for refusal to register and on-the-ground acquisition
of rights undermines the utility of registration even as it honors the
role of consumer perception in giving rise to trademark rights. Even
the most significant recent development toward convergence of registration and enforceable rights in fact underscores the disconnect between the two regimes. In B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.,20 the Supreme Court ruled that a refusal to register on
grounds of likelihood of confusion between the applicant’s mark and a
mark previously registered or used in commerce could have preclusive
effect in a subsequent infringement action.21 However, the Patent and
Trademark Office’s (PTO) inquiry into likely confusion does not take
into account how the marks are actually used in the marketplace, meaning that the decision conflates, rather than unifies, the two regimes.22
II. HOW THE EU REGISTRATION-BASED TRADEMARK
REGIME CAN IMPLEMENT TUSHNET’S PRESCRIPTIONS
Tushnet’s solutions in several respects endorse the European approach to trademark registration, including the “double identity” rule,
which bars the use of the same mark for the same goods as the registrant’s, without requiring a showing of likelihood of confusion.23
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17
18

Lanham Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).
Indeed, Congress shifted the Lanham Act’s emphasis toward security for enterprises when it
instituted the intent-to-use system, Lanham Act section 1(b), enabling applicants to file on the basis of an intent to use, rather than on demonstrating actual use. See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 4–6
(1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5581 (“The Lanham Act’s preapplication use requirement . . . creates unnecessary legal uncertainty for a U.S. business planning to introduce
products or services into the marketplace. It simply has no assurance that after selecting and
adopting a mark, and possibly making a sizable investment in packaging, advertising and marketing, it will not learn that its use of the mark infringes the rights another acquired through earlier
use. In an age of national, if not global, marketing, this has a chilling effect on business investment.” Id. at 5.).
19 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 878–80.
20 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
21 Id. at 1299.
22 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 893–99.
23 See id. at 932–34; EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 9(2)(a). Tushnet acknowledges the risk that
the rule will prove overprotective in the absence of fair use and comparative advertising excep-
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There are other features of the European Union Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR) not discussed in Tushnet’s article, but whose adoption
in the United States would be consistent with Tushnet’s prescriptions.
The remainder of this Response will identify and compare those features with the current U.S. registration regime in light of Tushnet’s
overall objective of making registration more “substantive.”24
Tushnet advocates a more “substantive” role for registration not in
order to strengthen the hand of trademark owners but on the contrary
to reduce the potential for overreach by trademark owners that results
from the current disparity between an administrative grant of rights
through registration and judicial enforcement of registered and unregistered trademarks.25 Among the reforms she urges, stricter assessment of the distinctiveness of the mark figures prominently.26 In particular, she argues the PTO should more vigorously police the border
between merely descriptive and inherently distinctive signs, for example, by “requiring the applicant to show real secondary meaning in the
market.”27 Under current U.S. trademark law, however, an applicant
whose mark would be unregistrable on grounds of mere descriptiveness28 may seek registration on the basis that the mark has acquired
distinctiveness, with “proof of substantially exclusive and continuous
use thereof as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years
before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made.”29 According to the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP),
“[t]he claim of five years of use is generally required to be supported
by an affidavit or declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 2.20, signed by the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
tions. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 68. The Court of Justice of the European Union (C.J.E.U.) has in
fact tempered the double identity rule by establishing a requirement that the use have “an adverse
effect on the functions of the trade mark” and then elaborating a range of elusively stated “functions.” Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA,
2010 E.C.R. I-2467, I-2502. In 2009, in L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, the C.J.E.U. explained:
These functions include not only the essential function of the trade mark, which is to
guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services, but also its other functions, in
particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and those
of communication, investment or advertising.
Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, I-5187; see also Case C-323/09,
Interflora Inc., v. Marks & Spencer plc, 2011 E.C.R. I-8625, I-8627 (addressing the function of
“guaranteeing the quality of that product or service or that of communication, investment or advertising”); Google France, 2010 E.C.R. at I-2503 (addressing “the function of indicating origin
and the function of advertising”); Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R.
I-10273, I-10316 (“[T]he essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of origin of
the marked goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin.”).
24 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 932.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 921–26.
27 Id. at 922.
28 Lanham Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012).
29 Id. § 2(f).
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applicant.”30 The PTO may, but currently is not obliged to, seek proof
not only of continuous use but also of acquired distinctiveness in
fact.31 Thus, enforceable nationwide rights may attach to descriptive
terms just on the applicant’s sworn statement of five years’ continuous
use.32 Moreover, as a result of a 1988 amendment, the five-year period
need not have preceded the application date: “any five-year claim
submitted on or after November 16, 1989, is subject to the new time
period. This applies even if the application was filed prior to that
date.”33 Because rights in registered trademarks run from the date of
the application,34 the amendment effectively confers trademark priority on signs that may not have been capable of being a trademark at
the time of application.
Compare the EUTMR’s approach to merely descriptive signs that
have allegedly acquired distinctiveness. Article 7(1)(c) bars registration
of “trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which
may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended
purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the
goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the
goods or services.”35 Article 7(3), however, provides: “Paragraph 1 . . .
(c) . . . shall not apply if the trade mark has become distinctive in relation to the goods or services for which registration is requested in consequence of the use which has been made of it.”36 The European
Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) Guidelines for Examination of European Union Trade Marks’s section on acquired distinctiveness37 explains:
Distinctive character acquired through use means that although the sign
ab initio lacks inherent distinctiveness with regard to the goods and services claimed, owing to the use made of it on the market, the relevant
public has come to see it as identifying the goods and services claimed in
the EUTM application as originating from a particular undertaking.38

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
30 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212.05(d) (Oct. 2016 ed.) [hereinafter TMEP] (citing
37 C.F.R. § 2.20 (2016)).
31 Id. §§ 1212, 1212.06.
32 In an infringement action, courts may seek proof of the actual strength of the mark; but as
Tushnet underscores, some courts may treat the fact of registration as evidence that consumers
perceive the sign as a trademark. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 878–80.
33 TMEP, supra note 30, § 1212.05 (citing Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (amending Lanham Act § 2(f))).
34 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).
35 EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 7(1)(c).
36 Id. art. 7(3).
37 EUROPEAN UNION INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION
OF EUROPEAN UNION TRADEMARKS, PART B SECTION 4, § 2.6 (2016) [hereinafter EUIPO
GUIDELINES].
38 Id. § 2.6.1.
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The Guidelines require that the applicant prove “a link between the
sign and the goods and services for which the sign is applied for, establishing that the relevant class of persons, or at least a significant proportion thereof, identify goods as originating from a particular undertaking because of the trade mark.”39 Thus, the EUIPO demands what
Tushnet would have the PTO require: placement of the burden of
proof on the applicant to demonstrate through evidence of actual use
that the sign has in fact acquired secondary meaning.40 Relevant evidence includes:
[T]he market share held by the mark in question; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the
amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant class of persons who, because of the mark, identifies
goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations.”41

Moreover, in contrast to the 1988 amendment to the Lanham Act discussed above, the EUIPO stresses that “[t]he evidence must prove that
distinctiveness through use was acquired prior to the EUTM application’s filing date.”42
Finally, the EUIPO Guidelines elaborate a requirement that lacks a
counterpart in the TMEP but that also responds to Tushnet’s concern
that trademark registration in the United States may hamper competi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39
40

Id. § 2.6.5.
Tushnet, supra note 2, at 923. In addition, as Tushnet observes, id. at 923–24 & nn.246–47,
European authorities police against bootstrapping a “limping” mark to the registered mark in
connection with which the weaker sign (often an element of trade dress) appears. See, e.g., Case
C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK Ltd, 2015 E.C.R. 604, 614 (citing Directive 2008/95/EC, art. 3(3), 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25, 27) (“[A]lthough the trade mark for which registration is sought [the three-dimensional form of the Kit Kat chocolate bar] may have been used as
part of a registered trade mark or in conjunction with such a mark, the fact remains that, for the
purposes of the registration of the mark itself, the trade mark applicant must prove that that
mark alone, as opposed to any other trade mark which may also be present, identifies the particular undertaking from which the goods originate.”).
41 Joined Cases C-217/13 & C-218/13, Oberbank AG v. Deutscher Sparkassen- und
Giroverband eV, 2014 E.C.R. 2012, 2019 (discussing Directive 2008/95/EC, art. 3(3), which addresses acquired distinctiveness in the same terms as EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 7(3)). In that
case, a survey of relevant consumers showed almost 70% recognition of term as a service mark.
Id. at 2015; see also Case C-542/07 P, Imagination Technologies Ltd v. OHIM, 2009 E.C.R. I-4937
(affirming Case T-461/04, Imagination Technologies v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. II-122 ¶¶ 70, 74, 79
(finding £30 million worth of sales of radios under the Pure Digital mark insufficient to prove acquired distinctiveness before date of application for registration because “the applicant should
have shown not only use of the sign applied for, but in addition the fact that the relevant consumer understood the sign not as a descriptive term, but also as a trade mark,” id. ¶ 74)).
42 EUIPO GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 2.6.3; see also id. § 2.6.3.1. But see EUTMR, supra
note 3, art. 52(2) (stating that if a mark is registered and is not inherently distinctive when cancellation proceedings are started, the proprietor can resist by showing it has subsequently acquired
distinctiveness).
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tion because the PTO may be establishing rights in signs that do not in
fact identify and distinguish the trademark owner’s goods or services.43 Lanham Act registration confers nationwide rights from the
date of filing; these benefits attach even to a section 2(f) registration
that issues following the applicant’s affidavit of continuous use (without actual proof of acquired distinctiveness),44 but neither the statute
nor the TMEP requires that the applicant have used the mark
throughout the United States. Thus, a U.S. trademark applicant could
acquire nationwide rights in a descriptive term without showing that,
throughout the United States, the mark in fact has come to “identify
and distinguish” its goods or services in the marketplace.45 By contrast, the “unitary character” of the European Union Trade Mark46
implies that the sign must be distinctive throughout the EU.47 The
EUIPO draws the conclusion that “acquired distinctiveness must be
established throughout the territory in which the trade mark did not,
ab initio, have such character . . . . [T]he unitary character of the
European Union trade mark requires a sign to possess a distinctive
character, inherent or acquired through use, throughout the European
Union.”48 An equivalent U.S. doctrine would similarly oblige the applicant not only to prove to the PTO that the mark had in fact come to
symbolize the applicant’s goods or services, but also that the relevant
consumers throughout the United States drew the necessary connection
between the mark and the goods or services.49
Importing these EU rules would promote Tushnet’s goal of countering anticompetitive behavior because they would ensure registration
of only marks of demonstrated distinctiveness. The EU approach also
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
43
44
45
46

See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 918–21.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2012).
Id. § 1127.
EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 1(2); see also id. art. 7(2) (stating that if an absolute ground of
refusal exists with respect to any part of the EU, registration must be refused as to the entire EU).
47 On the other hand, the EUTMR does not preempt national trademark registration in member states (nor use-based protection in member states that recognize rights on that basis); as a result, a mark that does not qualify for registration as an EU trademark may still be protected at
the national level in some subset of the EU’s member states.
48 EUIPO GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 2.6.6 (citations omitted).
49 Under the Dawn Donut doctrine, discussed in Tushnet, supra note 2, at 910–11, a federal
trademark registrant’s nationwide rights are not enforceable against junior users operating in localities where the registrant is not yet doing business. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores,
Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959). More recently, however, courts may be more inclined to
extend injunctive relief to “suppress junior users” (Tushnet’s phrase) in localities to which the registrant has not yet expanded. See Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“[I]t does not follow . . . that a senior user who has proven entitlement to an injunction
affecting one geographic area by reason of the junior user’s infringement must show the same
high degree of probability of harm in every further area into which the injunction might extend,
thus allowing the infringer free use of the infringing mark in all areas as to which the senior user
has not shown a substantial probability of confusion.” Id. at 47).
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buttresses one of Tushnet’s related recommendations. She remarks
that “requiring the applicant to show real secondary meaning in the
market . . . would have positive effects on the ITU [intent to use] system as well, since fewer marks would qualify for ITU protection in the
absence of use and market recognition.”50 This observation deserves
further elaboration. A U.S. application based on intent to use a mark
will qualify for registration once the applicant makes actual use of the
mark, and if none of the Lanham Act’s bars to registration applies.
Structurally, the mark must be inherently distinctive: if the mark is
registrable immediately upon first use in commerce,51 then its
registrability cannot depend on demonstration of distinctiveness acquired through some period of use.52 But given the market advantages descriptive terms confer,53 and because the line between inherent distinctiveness and mere descriptiveness often wavers,54 the
system does not necessarily discipline ITU applicants to select marks
solidly within the spectrum of inherent distinctiveness. Were an applicant required to demonstrate that borderline marks had acquired distinctiveness, those marks could not be the subjects of ITU applications; the ITU applicant therefore would be obliged to select marks far
from the line of demarcation. The line’s uncertainty, rather than encouraging applicants to approach it as closely as possible, would instead push applicants even further away from the zone of disqualified
marks.
The EU approach would achieve a similar result. There are no
ITU applications in the EU regime because use is not a prerequisite to
registration of an inherently distinctive mark. Instead, the registrant
has five years to make actual use in trade.55 In effect, the EUTMR
incorporates ITU for inherently distinctive marks. But if the mark
lacks distinctiveness, then the mark cannot be registered unless the
applicant proves that prior to filing the application, the mark had already acquired distinctiveness through actual use. As a result, no
rights arise without actual use unless the sign is inherently distinctive.
In conclusion, while I doubt Tushnet would endorse importing every aspect of EU trademark law, particularly regarding the scope of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
50
51
52

Tushnet, supra note 2, at 922.
15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (2012).
See TMEP, supra note 30, § 1212.09(a) (“Section 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), is limited by its
terms to ‘a mark used by the applicant.’ A claim of distinctiveness under § 2(f) is normally not
filed in a § 1(b) application before the applicant files an allegation of use, because a claim of acquired distinctiveness, by definition, requires prior use.”).
53 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 918 & n.220 (citing Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in
Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 596 (1988)).
54 See 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:18 (4th ed.
2016).
55 See EUMTR, supra note 3, arts. 15(1), 51(1)(a).
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protection of the mark once registered,56 the EU Trademark Regulation and Directive offer a model of a “substantive” registration regime
whose adoption could promote fairer competition by better policing
the claimed sign’s role as a trademark.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56 For example, compared with U.S. trademark doctrine, courts in the EU have yet to develop
a robust trademark parody exception. Compare Rebecca Tushnet, Make Me Walk, Make Me Talk,
Do Whatever You Please: Barbie and Exceptions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE
EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 405, 406 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C.
Ginsburg eds., 2014), with Robin Jacob, Parody and IP claims: A Defence? — A Right to Parody?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE, supra, at 427, 431. In addition, the scope of
EU protection against dilution, applicable where
the [defendant’s] sign is identical with, or similar to, the EU trade mark irrespective of
whether it is used in relation to goods or services which are identical with, similar to or
not similar to those for which the EU trade mark is registered, where the latter has a
reputation in the Union and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the EU trade
mark,
EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 9(2)(c) (emphasis added), likely is too broad for Tushnet — no fan of
the dilution doctrine, see generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008) — to wish its importation into U.S. law.

